The Financial Implications
Standards cost money. They are expensive
to write and maintain; they cost considerably
more to implement. Little information has
been provided since the initial writing of the
IMAS about their real costs. Certainly there
are some commercial contracts for which the
cost of IMAS implementation is significantly
higher than for other contracts. 5
As standards become increasingly stringent, there will be a correspondingly greater
cost to implement those standards. While
commercial clients may be able to bear this
additional cost, the financial cost for humanitarian work can reduce a donation’s effectiveness. Real cost in this situation is measured in
prolonging socioeconomic hardship through
additional injuries and deaths, and in further
delays in improving conditions for those we
are supposed to assist.

Summary
Standards are necessary for any mineaction activity, but standards must ref lect
actual need. The authors of the IMAS must
also balance humanitarian with commercial needs, and they must ensure that this
intention is not subject to different interpretations. Currently, evidence suggests a
widespread lack of understanding on how to
interpret the IMAS—this could point to failure of the standards.
As less money is available, standards could
be blamed for prolonging the period that many
communities have to coexist with mines. If
this is the case, then maybe standards will be
responsible for making the term humanitarian
mine action an oxymoron. It is time to carry
out mine action in a more (cost) effective, efficient and timely manner.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Mine Ban Enters into Force in Jordan
Following a royal decree, the 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban became an official part of Jordanian law.
The Kingdom of Jordan, which signed the Ottawa Convention banning the use of landmines in 1998,
has been working to eradicate landmines and other explosive remnants of war since that time. The
new law represents a deepening of the government’s commitment to addressing the landmine problem
in the kingdom.
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention are obliged to make consistent progress toward eliminating
the threat posed by landmines, and Jordan has been pursuing this goal since signing the Convention.
The government of Jordan created the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation in 2000
to direct policy for and supervise mine-action activities. The NCDR is chaired by HRH Prince Mired
and directs management and regulatory activities, as well as coordinating mine-action programs and
supervising the implementation of best policies and procedures.
The 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban now provides national legal punishments for anyone emplacing
AP mines in Jordan as well as anyone trading, developing, possessing or handling mines in other
ways. There are also punishments for anyone aiding or abetting any of these prohibited actions.
Exceptions to these regulations are provided to approved government parties actively involved in
landmine eradication—most notable are members of the Jordanian Armed Forces who use mines in explosive ordnance disposal training exercises.
Those found guilty of violating the statutes of the new law are subject to steep fines, imprisonment
and hard labor. Additionally, anyone who provides information to authorities on illegal activities
can receive legal protection for his/her assistance.
The new law also establishes the NCDR as the lead mine-action coordinating and supervising agency
in the country. The NCDR is now officially responsible for working with the armed forces and outside
agencies to ensure successful collaboration. The 2008 AP Mine Ban also gives the NCDR the authority
to make requests of international organizations for information as well as assistance with equipment and training.
Although it has made remarkable progress in addressing the landmine situation within and along its
borders, Jordan anticipates that its original deadline for landmine clearance by May 2009, as dictated by the Convention, may need to be extended to 2011.
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T

he Biblical parable of the two sons1
illustrates a great human dilemma
often repeated in literature and life.
It is a very simple story: One son responds to
his father’s request to work in the vineyard
by declining, yet reconsiders his intention
and in the end does his father’s bidding. The
other son, keen to appear obedient, accepts
the responsibility, but decides against doing
the work. The question of who has done the
father’s will answers itself.
This parable reminds me of the state of the
Ottawa Convention. 2 Four years ago in this
column, I commented about the undoubted
success and shortcomings of the Anti-personnel
Mine Ban Convention.3 Those observations
are, I believe, still true. The more timely issue,
however, is implied by the very nature of the
Convention itself. Is the Convention providing
guidance that induces practitioners to do
good, or does it provide a forum where officials
simply make meaningless conversation and so
become a clanging cymbal?4
Let us review how the “sons,” who said that
they were going to uphold the Convention, are
doing. There is at least one signatory, Venezuela,
still making active use of its emplaced antipersonnel landmines, even while making statements at meetings that it is fully committed to
the Convention. To my knowledge, no State
Party has questioned Venezuela’s noncompliant behavior, leaving only the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines to condemn the
action, calling it “highly disturbing.”5
Regarding mines retained for training
(Article 3), the Landmine Monitor reports that
“there is a clear history of little or no consumption [destruction] of retained mines by a significant number of States Parties.”6 Eighteen
countries have not reported destroying any
landmines since ratifying the Convention,
while 15 more of those with remaining stockpiles have not reported destroying APLs for
two or more years.6
Clearance is the focal point of mine
action; the Convention requires that 10 years
after accession, mine clearance must be complete. At the meetings of the States Parties in
Amman, Jordan, in November 2007, heavy
emphasis was put on this requirement. Yet,
it appears that at least 14 states will not
meet their 2009 deadlines, with four failing to commence clearance operations at
all.6 Indeed most of the discussion during
the clearance portion of the meeting dealt
with procedures for requesting extensions for
clearance operations.

In spite of the overwhelming good being
accomplished by the Ottawa Convention
ban on anti-personnel landmines, there are
indications that actual accomplishments and
adherence to its tenets are sometimes ignored
in favor of rhetoric. Worse is the tendency of
other signatories to turn a blind eye to these
shortfalls, not wishing to be accused of being
negative toward fellow States Parties.
The “other sons” (in this case, nonsignatories) have acted variously. Countries
that decided not to ban APLs via the Ottawa
Convention are not intrinsically evil. They
felt that they had a larger responsibility in
defending their allies (e.g., the United States),
believed chronic border problems necessitated
APL reliance (e.g., Finland), or they placed a
greater emphasis and reliability on more traditional arms-control venues (e.g., India).
It may surprise some to learn that the
United States has adhered to the spirit of the
Ottawa Convention since it was signed by the
first States Parties and whose last significant
use of APLs took place in the 1991 Gulf War
in order to defend Saudi Arabia, the same year
of the entry into force of the Convention. The
United States also has, beginning in 1988,
developed an extensive program of humanitarian mine-action programs, exercised leadership of the Mine Action Support Group,
managed a robust mine-detection and clearance research and development program,
and has destroyed well over 3.3 million of its
stockpiled landmines.7
Most of the 30 nonsignatories have
endorsed the concept of elimination of
APLs and 19 attended the Eighth Meeting
of States Parties in Jordan. Most have also
endorsed nontransfer or moratorium actions.
Many countries that are not parties to the
Convention have been taking steps toward it,
such as cessation of production and export.
If one were to assess the use of APLs today,
it is generally not states who are the culprits,
but factions, insurgents, drug lords, criminals
and terrorists.
A review of national mine action globally reveals some interesting, if predictable,
conclusions. Since the early 1990s, virtually
every government and country has come to
understand the insidious nature of APLs.
Some countries could quickly sign the Ottawa
Convention because they had no landmines,
were not disposed to use landmines, or were so
impressed by the need to ban landmines that
they decided to override whatever military
necessity APLs rendered—or perhaps they

signed because the political climate provided
them an altruistic persona.
The difference between these two sets of
countries—signatories and nonsignatories—
has been overblown; Finland and Norway,
the United States and Canada, and Turkey
and India are more alike in this regard than
they are different. All but the most roguish of
states desire to see the end of indiscriminate
APL use. The time has come for the global
mine-action community to accept all who
wish to see the humanitarian impact of landmines—as well as other explosive remnants of
war—eliminated. 8 The efforts that go into universalization and the finger-pointing it often
engenders not only sap the energy and unity
that could be focused on clearing landmines
and ERW, but worse, that creates holier-thanthou attitude that leads to words rather than
actions, recriminations rather than results,
and isolation rather than inclusion.
See Endnotes, page 110
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